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I. INTRODUCTION
Cape Canaveral, Florida, April 12, 1981. For two thunderous minutes
this morning, a plume of white fire ascended into the Florida sky before dis-
appearing, and a mighty cheer arose from the crowd below.
"Goodbye, you beautiful Columbia, " a woman yelled. In common with
approximately one million other spectators, she had spent a mostly sleepless
night swatting mosquitoes and listening to announcements. Tears streaming
from her eyes, she added, "Come home to us safely!"
For everyone, the launching of the space shuttle had been a great show,
as beautiful as a Fourth of July fireworks display. Those who had come for
the show went away satisfied.
For many, the launching of the shuttle was a welcomed reaffirmation of
the United States' ability to meet difficult challenges.'
In many ways, the space shuttle inaugurated a new phase in the
development of space as an international resource. The shuttle may be
used to launch satellites into orbit and has the additional capability of
retrieving and repairing satellites. As the number of satellites in orbit
increases, the problem of interference among satellites escalates. The is-
sue centers around the geostationary orbit and the electromagnetic spec-
trum as well as direct satellite broadcasting from orbiting transmission
stations to individual receivers.
The geostationary orbit is an area in space which allows a satellite to
remain in orbit over a single point of the earth's surface because of the
gravitational pull of the earth, moon, and other planets.' The electro-
magnetic spectrum is the range of frequencies capable of transmitting
signals from satellites.' The importance of the geostationary orbit be-
comes apparent when one considers that most telecommunications,
broadcasting, and weather satellites must be in an orbit over a specific
point of the earth, usually over a receiving station. Seven nonmilitary
uses for the geostationary orbit have been set forth by the United Nations
Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: communications, meteorol-
I N.Y.Times, Apr. 13, 1981, at A9, col. 5.
2 Arnopolous, The International Politics of the Orbit-Spectrum Issue, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE




ogy, earth resources and environment, navigation and aircraft control,
testing of new systems, astronomy, and data relay.4 While these seven
uses are by no means exclusive, they illustrate the many diversified tech-
nological activities that rely on the geostationary orbit.
The geostationary orbit is located at an altitude of approximately
35,786 kilometers from the equator of the earth5 and has a radius of
42,164 kilometers.6 Although the radius is quite expansive, it does not
allow for an unlimited number of satellites. The reason for this limita-
tion is that, while occupying a slot in space, a satellite requires a specific
radio frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum.7 These radio frequen-
cies must be different and the satellites must be approximately eighteen
kilometers apart so that there is no interference between the different
transmissions.8 Theoretically, the total number of satellites capable of
remaining in geostationary orbit is approximately 2000.' The current
number of satellites in geostationary orbit is 220.10 Crowding of the geo-
stationary orbit is a concern not only among the technologically-ad-
vanced nations making use of this international resource, but also among
developing countries which fear no room will remain for them to launch
geostationary satellites in the future.
A separate but related issue involves the controversy over transmis-
sion of broadcasting signals from the geostationary orbit. Most of these
signals are television broadcasts which must be transmitted from a geos-
tationary satellite in order to be received properly. Controversy has
arisen among nations which feel national sovereignty is violated by direct
broadcasting11 and those which believe direct broadcasting is consistent
with a policy of fostering the free flow of information.
12
This Comment will examine the current legal and probable future
state of the international zone known as the geostationary orbit and the
corresponding issue of direct satellite broadcasting. Additionally, this
4 Physical Nature and Technical Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit: Study Prepared by the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/203, at 15-16 (1977) [hereinafter U.N. Orbit Study].
5 35,786 kilometers equals approximately 22,366 miles. Gehrig, Geostationary Orbit-Technol-
ogy and Law, 19 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 267, 268 (1976).
6 42,164 kilometers equals approximately 26,352 miles. Id.
7 Arnopoulos, supra note 2, at 216.
8 Arnopoulos, A Situation Study of the Orbit-Sectrum Issue (Model and Applications), 8 AN-
NALS AIR & SPACE L. 288 (1983).
9 Arnopoulos, supra note 2, at 216.
10 U.N. Orbit Study, supra note 4, at 2.
11 See Comment, Current and Future Legal Issues of Direct Broadcast Satellites in International
Law, 45 LA. L. REV. 701, 703 (1985) ("T]he major concern of any country is loss of control over
[television and radio] program content available to its population.") [hereinafter Comment, Legal
Issues].
12 Id. at 713.
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Comment will analyze the impact of the varying positions of states re-
garding the geostationary orbit, direct satellite broadcasting, and the
likelihood of international agreement on issues regarding these concerns.
Finally, this Comment will propose possible solutions consistent with
current international law.
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT
A. The Bogota Declaration
The geostationary orbit over the Western Hemisphere has been the
focus of recent attention because eight countries 3 have claimed sover-
eignty to a substantial portion of it. On December 3, 1976, eight equato-
rial countries signed the Bogotfi Declaration.' 4 As stated in the
Declaration, the purpose of these countries' claims is that:
The geostationary orbit is a scarce natural resource, whose importance and
value increase rapidly with the development of space technology and with
the growing need for communication; therefore, the Equatorial countries
meeting in Bogotd have decided to proclaim and defend on behalf of their
peoples, the existence of their sovereignty over this natural resource.
1 5
The Bogoti Declaration theoretically could be used to prevent na-
tions from launching satellites into geostationary orbit. Its signatories
contend that the rationale for their claim of sovereignty is that the geo-
stationary orbit is a phenomenon caused by the gravitational pull of the
earth within their boundaries. The signatories to the Bogoti Declaration
claim that: "The geostationary orbit's existence depends solely on the
gravitational force of the earth, therefore, it is not part of outer space." 16
Such a claim of sovereignty is rejected by nations that have launched
satellites into geostationary orbit and developing nations which have not
yet launched such satellites.' 7 A majority of nations believe the geosta-
tionary orbit is a part of outer space and, as such, is governed by the
provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.'
8
13 The eight countries are: Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, and
Zaire. Declaration of the First Meeting of the Equatorial Countries, Dec. 3, 1976, I.T.U. Doc.
WARC-BS 81-E (1977), reprinted in 2 N. JASENTULIYANA & R. LEE, MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 383




17 Jakhu, The Legal Studies of the Geostationary Orbit, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 333, 343
(1982). As of 1981, the United States had more than 90 satellites in the geostationary orbit, the
Soviet Union had 50, other developed countries had approximately 50, and the lesser developed
countries had less than 30. 21 U.N. GAOR Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Legal Sub-
Comm. 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.105/C.2/SR.377 (1982) [hereinafter Peaceful Uses].
18 Arnopoulos, supra note 2, at 225.
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Most experts in the field do not agree with the Bogoti Declaration's
claim that the orbit's existence "depends solely on the gravitational force
of the earth."1 9
Space technology experts agree that the position of an artificial satellite in
the geostationary orbit is dependent upon several factors, such as: the
launch and station keeping propulsion, the attraction of the earth, the moon
and the sun, and the solar radiation pressure. Therefore the force of the
earth's attraction is merely one of the elements.20
Even if the gravitational force of the earth were the sole cause of the
geostationary orbit, it would be inaccurate to assume that the countries
lying on the equator create the gravitational force. "Achieving a geosta-
tionary orbit is actually dependent on the velocity and position of the
satellite as well as gravitational attraction which is, of course, created by
the total mass of the object being orbited."2
Indonesia, a signatory of the Bogot6 Declaration, counters the ex-
perts' testimony by insisting there is a special relationship between the
geostationary orbit and equatorial states. The Indonesian delegation to
the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has
argued:
The fact that placing a satellite over, say, the South Pole would fail to pro-
duce the same effect as placing it over the equator meant precisely that a
special physical relationship did exist. The argument that the geostationary
orbit was the property of the earth as a whole might be true in abstracto,
but, unfortunately perhaps, the earth's territory happened to be divided into
sovereign States. The logical extension of the argument would be to say
that the earth as a whole belonged equally to all States, something which
was manifestly not the case. Because of the special physical relationship
existing between the equator and the geostationary orbit, equatorial coun-
tries were particularly sensitive to the presence of satellites in the orbit, at
least with regard to remote sensing from such- satellites.2 2
B. The Chicago Convention
While the claim of sovereignty over a portion of space some 35,786
kilometers from each country's surface may seem far-reaching, if not far-
fetched, such claims have their base in modem international law.23 In
1944, fifty-four countries24 met at the Chicago Convention on Intema-
19 Id.
20 Gorbiel, The Legal Status of the Geostationary Orbit: Some Remarks, 6 J. SPACE L. 171, 176
(1979).
21 Comment, Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 710 (parenthesis omitted).
22 Peaceful Uses, supra note 17, at 8.
23 Qizhi, The Problem of Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space, 10 J. SPACE L. 157, 158
(1982).
24 Those 54 countries are: Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
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tional Civil Aviation and passed resolutions in the form of a convention.
Article I of the convention proclaims that: "[T]he contracting States rec-
ognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the
airspace above its territory."25 The definition of territory is contained in
Article II of the convention which states that: "[F]or the purposes of this
convention, territory of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and
territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, pro-
tection or mandate of such State."
2 6
The convention does not define airspace. As the convention imposes
no territorial limitation upon a state's right to define airspace, the coun-
tries that signed the Bogoti Declaration contend they may claim sover-
eignty to the geostationary orbit." Contrary to this position however, it
is argued that the Chicago Convention was drafted for the purpose of
establishing the rights of aircraft and of the nations over which such air-
craft fly.28 This argument becomes more persuasive when one considers
the fact that the Chicago Convention was convened more than a decade
before the Soviet Union launched Sputnik.29 Thus, while the application
of the Chicago Convention to a sphere of the universe untouched at the
time of the convention's drafting is innovative, it is also somewhat spe-
cious. Nevertheless, if it is accepted that the geostationary orbit is
outside the definition of airspace and falls within the definition of outer
space, other principles of international law may be applied for the pur-
pose of defining nations' rights to use the geostationary orbit.
C. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty
Under the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, signed on January 27, 1967
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran,
Iraq, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Norway, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and
Yugoslavia. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1181; Comment, Airspace-Outer Space? The Geostationary Orbit and the Need for a
Precise Definition of Outer Space, 4 N.Y.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 115, 119 (1982).
27 See Rosenfield, The Need to Distinguish Air Space from Outer Space, 20 COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW Or OUTER SPACE 61 (1977).
28 Bowen, The Chicago International Civil Aviation Conference, 13 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 308
(1945).
29 Sputnik was launched into orbit by the Soviet Union on Oct. 4, 1957. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5,
1957, at 1, col. 8.
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("1967 Outer Space Treaty"),3" the signatories31 retained "open access
to, and free use of all parts of this national environment."32 Article I of
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty declares: "The exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out
for the benefit and in the interests of all countries ... and shall be the
province of all mankind. Outer space, including the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, shall be free for exploration by all States.... ."' Thus, the
question of whether the eight equatorial countries that signed the Bogota
Declaration have a right to claim national sovereignty over the portions
of the geostationary orbit that lie above their countries is best answered
by asking the question: Is the geostationary orbit part of a country's air-
space or part of outer space? If it can be determined that the geostation-
ary orbit is part of outer space, then the terms of the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty apply.3"
The countries which signed the Bogota Declaration are adamant in
their denial that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty applies to the geostationary
orbit. A portion of the Bogotd Declaration states that, "[t]here is no
valid or satisfactory definition of outer space which may be advanced to
support the argument that the geostationary orbit is included in outer
space."35 Yet, the equatorial nations may be basing their stance regard-
ing the location of the geostationary orbit more on self-interest than out
of scientific data. In fact, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits the type
of claim made by the signatories to the Bogotd Declaration. Article II of
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty states, in part, that outer space, "is not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty by means of use
30 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No.
6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter 1967 Outer Space Treaty].
31 The following signatories are parties to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty: Antigua & Barbuda,
Argentina, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina
Faso, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland,
France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guinea-
Bissau, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Keyna, Korea, Kuwait,
Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland,
Romania, St. Christopher & Nevis, St. Lucia, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Re-
public, Thailand, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Socialist Republic
of Vietnam, Yemen (Aden), and Zambia.
32 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 30.
33 Id.
34 Jakhu, supra note 17, at 355.
35 See Bogoti Declaration, supra note 13, art. II.
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or occupation or by any other means."' 36 Thus, a determination that the
geostationary orbit is in outer space would result in the invalidation of
sovereignty claims of the Bogotd Declaration under the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty.
III. DEMARCATION OF OUTER SPACE
Contrary to the Bogotd Declaration's claim that there is no satisfac-
tory definition supporting the argument that the geostationary orbit is
located in outer space,37 modem science provides a great deal of evidence
regarding the demarcation of outer space and airspace. It is generally
accepted that airspace activities cannot take place beyond an altitude of
sixty kilometers. 38 This would suggest that the sovereignty of airspace
issue, based on the international law of the 1944 Chicago Convention,
stops at a level of sixty kilometers. Beyond that altitude, the 1944 Chi-
cago Convention does not apply. The signatories of the Bogoti Conven-
tion, nevertheless, may argue that the top limit of airspace need not
necessarily be the bottom limit of outer space.39 Thus, outer space may
not begin immediately beyond the sixty kilometer airspace limit. Other
data would be required to determine the lower boundary of outer space.
Granting the equatorial nations of the Bogoti Convention this point, it
becomes necessary to search for a means of determining the beginning
point of outer space.
A logical lower boundary limit for outer space would be the lowest
possible point of orbit sufficient to maintain a satellite. This approach
means that "all satellites launched into orbits up to now are in outer
space and outside the realm of state sovereignty."'  Thus, the beginning
point of outer space can be determined by calculating the lowest possible
altitude of an orbiting satellite. At present, that point is approximately
ninety to 100 kilometers above the surface of the earth.4'
36 See 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 30, art. II.
37 See Bogoti Declaration, supra note 13, art. II.
38 Although there is no express definition of outer space, one may be inferred from statements
made by the International Telecommunications Union to the U.N. Secretariat limiting airspace to a
sixty-kilometer altitude. The Question of the Definition and/or Delimination of Outer Space: Back-
ground Paper prepared by the Secretariat, 5, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/7/Add. 1 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter Background Paper].
39 It has been hypothesized that there exists an area between airspace and outer space, which has
been termed menospace. Peaceful Uses, supra note 17, at 2.
40 Qizhi, supra note 23, at 160.
41 Background Paper, supra note 38, at 22.
In principle it would be possible to construct a special purpose artificial satellite which would
survive below [ninety kilometers] or at any height for that matter. There would, however, be no
gain in any application of such a satellite, and its cost would be out of proportion because such
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Simple arithmetic demonstrates that the 35,786 kilometer altitude of
the geostationary orbit is clearly above the ninety to 100 kilometer lower
boundary limit set by the lowest orbiting satellites. This conclusion has
been reached by the Soviet Union which advocates the demarcation of
the boundary between airspace and outer space at an altitude of 100 kilo-
meters.42 The Soviet Union's delegation to the United Nations Commit-
tee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has submitted a proposal stating
that: "The region above 100 kilometers altitude from the sea level of the
earth is outer space."43 The Soviet Union has been even more unequivo-
cal in affirming its position that the geostationary orbit is located in outer
space. The Soviet Union's delegation has remarked that the geostation-
ary orbit is obviously situated in outer space.
The United States has also arrived at a position on the location of
the geostationary orbit. Its delegation to the United Nations Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has stated that: "[A]t an altitude of
approximately 35,000 km, the GSO [Geostationary Orbit] was clearly
subject to the provisions in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibiting any
appropriation by claim of sovereignty and stipulating that outer space
should be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimina-
tion of any kind and on a basis of equality."'
The superpowers are not alone in declaring the geostationary orbit
to be well within the bounds of outer space and thus subject to the provi-
sions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. Countries which have been expo-
nents of the position that the geostationary orbit lies in outer space
include: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
German Democratic Republic, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom.45 Such a list of countries appears impressive, not merely be-
cause of its clout, but also because of its diversity.
The signatories of the BogotA Declaration not only face opposition
to their claims of sovereignty from countries in the Northern Hemi-
sphere, but must also contend with dissension among their ranks. Ecua-
dor, a signatory of the Bogoti Declaration, has expressed the opinion
an extreme mass-to-area ratio can be achieved only be[sic] using heavy materials such as lead,
gold, uranium, or platinum in large quantities.
42 This method of determining the lower boundary of outer space is not absolute. The boundary
would increasingly become lower as technological advances allow satellites to achieve lower orbit.
This fact is irrelevant to use of the lower boundary, however, because the claims of the Bogoti
Declaration are well above the current lowest feasible satellite orbits. See Cheng, The Legal Regime
of Air Space and Outer Space: The Boundary Problem, Functionalism versus Spatialism: The Major
Premises, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 323, 326 (1980).
43 Id.
44 Peaceful Uses, supra note 17, at 2.
45 Jakhu, supra note 17, at 340 n.23.
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that it would be useful to delimit outer space by setting the upper limit of
air space at an altitude of about 100 kilometers.4 6 Such an opinion im-
plicitly accepts the geostationary orbit as being within the boundary of
outer space.4 7 The signatories to the Bogoti Declaration may have de-
cided to give up their claim of sovereignty based on newly available sci-
entific evidence regarding the limits of outer space. A more likely
hypothesis, however, is that the equatorial countries were never very seri-
ous about gaining property rights to the geostationary orbit, but were
using the issue to assert their position vis-a-vis the developed nations.
It has been suggested that, "the equatorial countries used the BogotA
Declaration as a political tool rather than to seriously assert their sover-
eignty claims."48 This would explain Ecuador's willingness to accept the
proposals for a lower boundary of outer space. As stated by Ram S.
Jakhu, an expert on the geostationary orbit issue: "[T]he real purpose of
the BogotA Declaration seems to be the application of political pressure
on a few developed countries that are monopolizing the geostationary
orbit and consequently restraining the use of the orbit by late-comer de-
veloping countries."49 In the words of another expert, Linda R. Sit-
tenfeld, "Claiming sovereignty over the geostationary orbit is an
apparent attempt by states currently without satellite technology to pro-
tect their territory as against those states with satellite technology."50
Such motives would explain testimony by Colombia's representative
at the 1982 meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Colombia's representative stated that the
Bogotd Declaration:
[S]ought to ensure genuine benefits for the international community as a
whole, through equitable utilization of the geostationary orbit in such a way
as to take into account the needs and safeguard the rights and interests of
the developing countries in the various regions of the world. It was for that
reason that not only the equatorial countries, but the developing world as a
whole, had been urging, with ever increasing emphasis, the need to update
the 1967 Treaty. Only in that way could a more equitable, harmonious,
and consistent body of space law be established.5 1
This statement suggests that the signatories to the Bogotd Declara-
tion were not concerned that their claim of sovereignty over the geosta-
tionary orbit directly conflicted with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
46 Peaceful Uses, supra note 17, at 6.
47 Jakhu, supra note 17, at 343.
48 Id. at 344.
49 Id. at 341.
50 Comment, The Evolution of a New and Viable Concept of Sovereignty for Outer Space, 4
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 199, 209 (1980).
51 Peaceful Uses, supra note 17, at 4.
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Rather, the equatorial countries sought to challenge the provisions of the
1967 Outer Space Treaty by claiming sovereignty over the geostationary
orbit. Assuming this argument to be true - and the evidence suggests
there is more to the geostationary orbit issue than friendly international
squabbling - then the entire problem may be seen as part of the larger
political struggle of developing countries to gain economic and political
power in world affairs. Some commentators feel that the geostationary
orbit issue is at the center of developing nations' call for a new interna-
tional economic order.5" Yet, it would be an oversimplification to sug-
gest that the geostationary orbit issue is merely another variation of the
"haves" against the "have nots."
IV. DIRECT SATELLITE BROADCASTING
A more practical aspect of the direct satellite broadcasting contro-
versy involves the rights of countries to limit the signals received by their
citizens. This problem is termed "spillover" and is best understood by a
brief explanation of signal transmissions. In order for a satellite to
broadcast directly to receiver stations, it must be in geostationary orbit.
From this orbit, the signals can reach a wide transmission area of ap-
proximately one million square miles.53 Thus, depending upon the shape
and area of a country, a direct satellite broadcast aimed at one country
may be received by citizens of another country.
The most outspoken proponent of strict limits on direct satellite
broadcasting is the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's main fear is the
westernization of its citizens. 4 A similar concern has been expressed by
some developing countries which fear that their citizens might lose their
cultural identity. 5 The opposing position may best be summarized by
the United States and the United Kingdom, nations which advocate
"complete freedom of the flow of ideas and information without any reg-
ulation, based on the notion that these concepts are so fundamental to
individuals that no restrictions could be tolerated."56
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty - the only treaty which may be con-
sidered applicable to the direct satellite broadcasting controversy -
52 Arnopoulos, supra note 2, at 218-19.
53 Comment, Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 708.
54 Id. at 712.
55 Le Duc, Direct Broadcast Satellites: Parallel Policy Patterns in Europe and the United States,
27:2 J. BROADCASTING 99, 100 (1983).
56 Comment, Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 713.
57 Treaties which address outer space include the Moon Treaty, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 46), U.N. Doc. A34/68 (1979); Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Article II of
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 7:788(1986)
makes a reference to United Nations General Assembly Resolution
110(11) which condemns "propaganda designed or likely to provoke or
encourage any threat to peace."58 Reference to this clause, combined
with the general principles of Article I - the "open access" article -
and Article II - prohibiting national appropriation of outer space - is
used by the Soviet Union to justify its call for strict regulation of direct
satellite broadcasting. However, the international community as a whole
has regarded the 1967 Outer Space Treaty as allowing any peaceful use of
outer space. 59
Developing countries have attempted to argue that, under the Bo-
gotd Declaration, direct broadcasting satellites violate the national sover-
eignty of the equatorial nations.6 ° Yet, the criticisms of the BogotA
Declaration discussed above may be reiterated when considering such
arguments. Furthermore, Article I of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, used
by the Soviet Union to justify its position, may be used to counter both
the Soviet Union's and developing countries' positions since Article I es-
tablished the basic rights of all nations to freely use the resources of outer
space. The international community, through custom and treaty, has in-
dicated "that the [Bogotd] Declaration places no restrictions on [direct
satellite broadcasting]. '"61
V. RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The geostationary orbit and direct satellite broadcasting controver-
sies are the result of the inevitable conflict between the equitable and
efficient allocation of resources. The geostationary orbit issue places the
developed countries which have the technological resources and skills re-
quired to make use of the attributes of the geostationary orbit at odds
with those countries which are afraid that, when they acquire the re-
quired skill to make use of the geostationary orbit, the resource will have
vanished. At the same time, the direct satellite broadcasting issue places
countries respecting the free flow of information in opposition to those
countries seeking to control the dissemination of information.
the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Sept. 1, 1972, 24
U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762; and Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astro-
nauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 23, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119. None of these, however, are applicable to direct satellite
broadcasting.
58 1967 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 30.
59 Brooks, Technological and Legal Aspects of Environmental Monitoring, I J. SPACE L. 6, 35
(1973).
60 It may be observed that the U.S.S.R. cannot make this claim without jeopardizing its position
on the geostationary orbit issue.
61 Comment, Legal Issues, supra note 11, at 710.
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An analysis of the problem of information control leads to the reali-
zation that the cause of the concerns of the Soviet Union and developing
countries is not simply the broadcasting of signals by other countries, but
the reception of those signals by their citizens. The controversy dissi-
pates when one realizes the need for receivers capable of decoding the
transmissions. Yet the Soviet Union, a state which has shown itself capa-
ble of controlling the information available to its citizens, believes it is
more effective to control information disseminated by direct satellite
broadcasting at its source.
The solution to the spillover aspect of the geostationary satellite
controversy is for the countries supporting the free flow of information to
respond to the proposed restrictions by stating: "We deny your right to
restrict satellite transmissions at their source." Thus, countries such as
the Soviet Union which seek to control the availability of information to
their citizens should bear the costs of restricting the reception of direct
broadcasting signals, rather than their transmission. The advantage of
placing such costs on the restricting party is that an international contro-
versy is relegated to the status of a domestic problem, a fact which is
appropriate when one considers that the potential controversy is caused
by the restricting nation's domestic policies.
The cultural identity problem may also be handled separately by
each country. This is most practical because cultural identity, like infor-
mation control, is domestic in nature.62
Addressing the broader problem of the geostationary orbit as an in-
ternational resource, some countries, such as those that signed the Bo-
gotA Declaration, would like to see a strict allocation of the slots within
the geostationary orbit.63 Yet, even if it were decided that strict alloca-
tion was the best solution to the resource allocation problem, the more
challenging problem of how to allocate the resource would remain.
Should the slots created in the geostationary orbit be apportioned on a
one-nation-one-slot basis, like votes in the United Nations General As-
sembly? Alternatively, should the technological advances of some coun-
tries be recognized and credited? In other words, what does one do
about the space already being taken up by satellites most of which are
owned by technologically-advanced countries? Or should the satellite ac-
62 The cultural identity problem is not universally recognized as a genuine problem. It may be
argued that prohibiting a citizen's access to information from other countries as a means of preserv-
ing that citizen's cultural identity is merely a smoke screen to keep the citizen ignorant of the world
beyond national boundaries.
63 Comment, Communication Satellites and the Geostationary Orbit: Reconciling Equitable Ac-
cess with Efficient Use, 14 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 859, 861 (1982) [hereinafter Comment,
Communication].
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tivities of techologically-advanced countries be placed on hold until the
developing countries catch up?
The current situation, favored by some countries such as the United
Kingdom and the United States, is a prior-in-time, prior-in-right sys-
tem.64 As explained by Martin L. Stern:
Under the current regulatory scheme, a user's only real obligation is to
avoid harmful interference with prior users who are operating pursuant to
Radio Regulations. This scheme implicitly protects users that are first in
time, and requires newcomers to approach the existing stakeholders and
seek such accommodation as they are willing to provide.
65
This is the system the equatorial nations, through their Bogoti Declara-
tion, and other developing nations, are attempting to change. "Develop-
ing countries contend that this priority of use will preclude their access
to the resource even when they reach a level of technological sophistica-
tion sufficient to support their own satellite systems. 6 6
Yet a prior-in-time, prior-in-right plan has precedent in the law of
real property. In many respects, it is similar to land use zoning "where
prior users retain virtual permanent advantage., 67 A compromise solu-
tion that has some support in the United States is termed "block allot-
ment planning."6 8
A block allotment plan allocates to a service and orbital location a "block"
or continuous position of frequency and is predicated on the theory that an
individual country should be allowed to meet its particular communications
requirements in the most efficient way it can once it is ready to implement
its system .... [A] nation would be granted one or more slots, a block of
frequency, and specified service areas. Within these parameters, a nation
could allocate the resource to its domestic users as it saw fit.
69
The block allotment plan retains flexibility and allocative efficiency,
because a nation in need of blocks could purchase or lease unused or
unwanted blocks from another nation. Small nations could combine
their resources and create a multinational system.7" Unlike the strict al-
location system, block allotment planning might combine the resources
64 Id. at 866.
65 Id. (quoting Ruthowski, The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference: The LT. U. in a
Changing World, 13 INT'L LAW. 289, 291 (1979)).
66 Office of International Communications Policy, U.S. Dep't of State, Delegation to the 1979
General World Administrative Radio Conference 74-80 (T.D. Serial No. 116).
67 S. BROWN, N. CORNELL, L. FABIAN, & E. WEIss, REGIMES FOR THE OCEAN, OUTER SPACE,
AND WEATHER 176, 181 (1977).
68 RARC-83 Advisory Committee, Third Progress Report of Working Group 2B of Subcommit-
tee 2, at 2 (Mar. 3, 1982).
69 Comment, Communication, supra note 63, at 874-75.




of very small countries, so as not to waste the resource of an entire block.
The block allotment planning system is based upon market principles.
Assuming a world market for the resources created, efficient allocation
would occur through market forces. Obviously, attempts might be made
to create a cartel within the block allotment planning system. Interna-
tional safeguards, however, tailored after national antitrust laws, could
be used to help ensure the integrity of such a market system.
It should be stressed that block allotment planning does not address
the problem of determining the quantity of blocks to be allotted to each
country. Such an allotment would require compromises among nations;
but compromise may not be impossible. One reason is that the industri-
ally-developed nations have expressed interest in block allotment plan-
ning. Developing countries have an incentive to compromise because the
status quo is unacceptable to them and their bargaining position is not
strong. If developing countries insist on strict allocation, they may find
themselves alone in the conference room, while the technologically-ad-
vanced countries are busy launching satellites to fill the remaining space
within the geostationary orbit.
The same market forces that will allow the block allotment planning
system to work efficiently will create incentives to find new solutions to
the geostationary orbit saturation problem. With today's shuttle technol-
ogy, it is possible to launch and repair orbiting satellites. Market forces
will encourage countries to remove inactive satellites from the geostatio-
nary orbit when it becomes economically efficient to replace them with
more active and powerful satellites.
Allowing market forces to create efficient allocation of the geostatio-
nary orbit resources will stimulate new technological advances. One
such benefit which may currently be foreseen is the increased efficiency of
satellites and satellite transmissions. For example, it is not unrealistic to
assume that the buffer space required between satellites may be greatly
reduced through technological advances. As with advances in computer
technology (which in the last twenty years have greatly reduced the size
and cost of computer hardware), advances in satellite technology may
lead to geometric increases in the capabilities of satellite systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Spillover from direct satellite broadcasting is not completely a prob-
lem of international proportions. The agitation resulting from spillover
is a symptom, in part, of internal political troubles of states desiring to
restrict their citizens' access to the free flow of information. Those na-
tions responsible for direct satellite broadcasting may justifiably claim
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the right to continue broadcasting under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
Nations which object to direct satellite broadcasting because it interferes
with their political objectives will simply have to implement their restric-
tions on the domestic rather than the international level and bear the
costs of such restrictions themselves.
Nations claiming to fear the impact of direct satellite broadcasting
on their cultural identity should not be permitted to disrupt the advances
sought and achieved by other countries. The cultural identity problem
must be removed from the international arena and consigned to the do-
mestic level as well.
The broader concerns of resource allocation of the geostationary or-
bit could be resolved through an international forum such as the United
Nations. Block allotment planning appears to be the best solution since
it addresses the rights of the developing countries while allowing market
forces to efficiently allocate and maximize the resource.
The technology blamed for consuming the limited resources of the
geostationary orbit may provide the solution to these concerns. The key
to meeting the challenge is to create a system that allows for resource
maximization. The time has come for the nations of the world to imple-
ment such a system.
Michael J. Finch
